English version       Kontakt 
ak_logo
   
Archiv

Hauptseite Archiv | << 1996 (18) Heft 2 | 1997 (19) Heft 2 >>

Heft bestellen

 
1997 (19) Heft 1

Kompensation oder Überzeugung?

 


Abstracts | Inhalt | Editorial

Bruno S. Frey
Unerwünschte Projekte, Kompensation und Akzeptanz
3-14

Abstract: Democracies find it difficult, and sometimes impossible to get through projects desired by a large share of the population because these are strongly opposed by local residents (NIMBY: Not In My Back Yard). As a solution for these conflicts economists proposed offering (monetary) compensation to the citizens of the host community. Experiences with many different projects and countries reveal, however, that monetary payments are incapable of solving the NIMBY-problem. A monetary offer to accept an otherwise undesired project undermines civic virtue. This crowding-out effect is empirically demonstrated using the search for a nuclear repository in Switzerland. A satisfactory strategy to overcome the NIMBY-problem takes into account the procedure, the time sequence, as well as the type of compensation offered.

Download (1'616 KB)

letzte Seite | Seitenanfang

 

Iris Bohnet
Diskurs - die Protektion der Kommunikation
15-32

Abstract: The goal of discourse-based decision-making is to free negotiations from self-interested, strategic interactions. In this paper it is argued that the absence of interests may lead to both efficiency losses and redistribution between participants of the discourse and outsiders. The latter effect is the stronger, the more personal relationships between discourse participants become. Therefore, it is essential to validate the recommendations arrived at in discourses in democratic decision-making processes that are driven by competition between different points of views and interests.

Download (2'583 KB)

letzte Seite | Seitenanfang

 

Katharina Holzinger
Kompensationen in alternativen Konfliktregelungsverfahren
33-63

Abstract: In many cases collectively desirable projects can be carried out only after considerable social conflict because the unequal distribution of burden and benefit from such projects leads to local opposition. From an economic perspective this problem can (and should) be resolved by compensating those who are negatively affected, Using a fictitious example, the author demonstrates that compensation packages will (a) increase the collective welfare, (b) have a positive redistributive effect, and (c) contribute to unblocking negotiation standstills that result from local veto, In actual practice, however, compensation offers will often be rejected by those affected. In order to increase the acceptability of compensation, it is important that all the possibilities to limit and restitute damage be explored before consideration is given to acceptable forms of substitution or compensation, The search for adequate means of substitution and compensation requires the inclusion of all parties affected. Therefore alternative dispute resolution provides an ideal framework for such a process.

Download (3'955 KB)

letzte Seite | Seitenanfang

 

Daniel J. Fiorino
Regulatory Policy and the Consensus Trap: An Agency Perspective
64-76

Abstract: Regulatory agencies in the United States have relied increasingly on consensus-based decision processes to build public support for their policies. If they are well-designed and managed effectively, consensus-based processes may increase support for an agency's policies and enhance its institutional legitimacy. But poorly-designed processes may lead to a consensus trap, in which an agency commits to making decisions based on a consensus the participants will never be able to achieve, Two recent initiatives of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency - negotiated rulemaking and the Common Sense Initiative suggest factors that may be associated with more and less sucessful consensus-based processes.

Download (1'882 KB)

letzte Seite | Seitenanfang

 

Rainer Döbert
Rationalisierungseffekte durch Diskurse Beobachtungen aus einer Technikfolgenabschätzung
77-107

Abstract: With steadily accumulating knowledge and increasing differentiation of access to knowledge democracies face the troublesome problem of technocracy. A solution was sought in widened participation without giving up the claim that, rationality, would have a better chance of being realized. New, constructivist, theories renounce this claim on the basis of equally valid, rationalities,. This paper tries to refute this view by specifying the concept of rationality and by analysing discourse mechanisms furthering rationality. This is done by reconstructing some lines of argumentation of a technology assessment of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops. Conclusions arise which are difficult to reject because there is a binding form of rationality at work. But rational argumentation does not guarantee consensus in politicized debates.

Download (4'505 KB)

letzte Seite | Seitenanfang

 

René von Schomberg
Öffentlichkeit als Kontrolle technologischer Innovation. Aspekte langfristiger Planung
108-125

Abstract: In convential democratic decison making, a contradiction has evolved between the demands of long term planning and democratic participation. In this article I will analyse, in how far new modes of decison making, such as national ethics committees, consensus conferences and participatory policy making on the basis of a precautionary principle, has been succesfull in coping with this contradiction. I will conclude that only participatory policy making could meet.

Download (2'781 KB)

letzte Seite | Seitenanfang

 

Hauptseite Archiv

a&k cover

 

Lucius Verlag
© Die www-Ausgabe der Zeitschrift und alle in ihr enthaltenen einzelnen Beiträge und Abbildungen sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlags unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. ISSN 0171-5860
Lucius Verlag Ethik-Zentrum Uni Zuerich Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut Uni Duesseldorf