Thomas E. Wartenberg

The Forms of Power

Abstract: The question of how to define the concept of social power has
been a focus of controversy among social theorists. In this paper, I put
forward a definition of social power that avoids many of the pitfalls of
previous attempts at such a definition. Roughly, I define the power which
one agent has over another as the ability that the dominant agent has to
control the situation within which the subservient agent acts. Using this
basic definition of power, I go on to define many of the central forms in
which power actually exists, forms that are conceptualized by such
concepts as force, coercion, and influence. I show that these different
forms of power can all be understood as specifications of the generic
definition of power that I offered and go on to develop an account of how
they function in relation to one another in actual relationship of social
power.

The concept of social power is one over which social theorists have argued
a great deal in recent years. In part, this is because theorists of power
have attempted to satisfy two competing demands. On the one hand, they
have sought to produce an empirically applicable theory of power, one that
can form the basis of an empirical research program. This has led to an
emphasis on empirical observability as a criterion for an adequate theory
of power. On the other hand, power theorists have also sought to provide
an insightful conceptualization of the phenomena that are normally referred
to by the term "power". This desire has led to more refined concept-
ualizations of power, ones that are better able to capture the complex
manner in which power is exercised and maintained in the social world.

One branch of recent research into the nature of social power has
attempted to produce a definition of what it is for one agent to have power
over another agent.[1] The attempts to produce such a definition show the
importance of the two demands I have just discussed. For example, Robert
Dahl proposed the following definition of power: "A has power over B to
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise
do."[2] This definition provoked a great deal of controversy because of its
highly restrictive nature. According to Dahl, only overt changes of B's

behavior could be used as evidence for the ascription of power over B to A. As a result, a number of social theorists offered alternative definitions of the concept of "power over", definitions that did not rely on the behaviorist assumptions that governed Dahl's definition and which, they argued, could therefore provide a more adequate conceptualization of social power. Although these attempts improved upon the rather limited conception of power presents in Dahl's work, there is general consensus that none of them has provided an empirically applicable and theoretically adequate conception of "power over".[3]

In this paper, I shall put forward a definition of one agent's power over another agent that does not suffer from the defects of previous attempts to define this notion. It is my contention that the concept of one agent possessing power over another agent can be given an adequate definition once this idea is placed within the framework of concepts which are used to conceptualize human social agency. Beginning with the intuitive idea that power over a social agent entails that some aspect of her social agency was necessitated rather than being freely chosen, I will present a definition of this concept that gives a clear, empirical specification of how such necessitation can be effected.[4]

My argument will develop in two stages. In the first, I will outline the framework of concepts which are necessary for conceptualizing human social agency and define the notion of one agent having power over another agent by means of them. This will provide a specification of the concept of "power over" that is a marked improvement over previous attempts. I will then go on to show that such diverse concepts as "influence", "force", and "coercion" indicate specific ways in which such social necessitation can be realized. The account of an agent's power over another agent which I put forward demonstrates the existence of a unified concept of an agent's power over another which can be specified in a variety or more particular manners.

The previous theorists of power have, of course, attempted to do something like what I am doing here. However, their attempts have been hampered by inadequacies in their social ontologies and scientific methodologies.[5] It is my contention that my definition of "power over" is superior to previous attempts to define that concept. While it is, on the one hand, specific enough to be of use in empirical research, it nonetheless presents a broad enough conception of power to encompass the wide range of phenomena that are normally referred to by that concept. As a result, it successfully mediates the twin demands that have governed the work ot the theorists of power.

Before developing this argument, however, let me make a remark about the terminology I shall use. In my definition of social power, I will follow the

usage of many social theorists who use the concept of a social agent to refer to the two participants in a social power relation. Thus, what I will be attempting to define is the social power of one agent over another agent. There are two reasons for this particular usage. The first is that the concept of a social agent allows one to refer, without further specification, to both individual human agents and to such collections of agents as are able to act in a unified manner. That is, I shall count both individuals and groups as the sorts of entities that both possess social power and are the objects of such possession, a practice common to many power theorists.[6] Steven Lukes, for example, while stating that "every-day usage (has the) unfortunate connotation ... that the exercise of power is a matter of individuals consciously acting to affect others", decides "to abandon these assumptions and to speak of the exercise of power whether by individuals or by groups, institutions, etc..."[7] Although I do not think that "everyday usage" is as univocal as Lukes maintains, I will accept the general usage that he recommends.

The second feature of the use of the term "agent" to refer to the actors in a social power relationship to which I would like to call attention is the specific content of that concept as a means of conceptualizing the basic actors in society. I use this term because, for the following discussion, I will simply be considering human beings in so far as they are actors on the social stage. I shall not be interested in any more particular charac-terization of the human being than one which says of her that she is capable of engaging in social action both habitually and deliberately. In so far as a human being is able to do this, I will call her an agent. Similarly, I shall consider groups of human beings such as organizations and institutions only in so far as they are capable of performing actions. This usage involves a high degree of abstraction, for it treats individuals and groups simply in their capacities as social actors and not in any more determinate manner.

Finally, let me note that, in discussing the power that one agent has over another, I shall refer to the agent who possesses or exercises power as the superordinate agent in the power relation and to he agent over whom power is possessed or exercised as the subordinate agent. Although this terminology is somewhat ponderous, its generality allows me to characterize the two 'positions' in a power relation without the misleading connotations which many alternative designations involve.

The Ontology of Human Agency

Before presenting my definition of the power of one agent over another, I shall introduce some concepts from action theory, concepts that con-ceptualize the ontological structure of the situation within which social agents act. These concepts will form the framework within which I will be able to define an agent's power over another.

In thinking about the basic ontological structure of the situation of human beings considered as social agents, there are a number of general observations to be made. First of all, human beings always exist in a social and natural context that determines a set of possible courses of action that are available to them as agents. All sorts of different factors determine this space of possible courses of actions that are available to an agent in a given situation. For example, the physical limitations that a given social agent has cause her to have only certain courses of action available to her. If she had a different set of physical capacities, there would be other courses of action that she could pursue. A first aspect of an agent's situation, then, consists in the possible courses of action that she has available to her.

A second aspect of the structure of human social agency is the agent's assessment of her situation. The objective situation of a social agent is not all that determines how an agent will act; the agent's interpretation of her situation is a significant element of human agency that must be acknowledged in a theoretical account of such agency. This assessment consists, in turn, of two aspects. The first is the agent's understanding of the alternative courses of action that she might pursue in a given situation. Such a set of alternatives is not always active in the sense that an agent acts only after a deliberate going through of these alternatives. Nonetheless, the presence of such alternatives in situations where an agent does deliberate about which course of action to pursue gives us a clue to their role in human action. The second aspect of an agent's assessment of her situation is her evaluation of the alternative courses of action with which she is faced. For example, an agent may choose one action over another because of the consequences that accrue to her from pursuing it rather than the other action. On the other hand, an agent might choose one course of action because it is the sort of action that she thinks she should choose. In such deliberations, the agent is evaluating the courses of action which she sees as available to her, and then acting on the basis of such evaluations.

I shall conceptualize these generic ontological features of human social agency by means of the concept of an agent's action-environment. In the most general sense, the concept of an action-environment specifies the structure within which an agent exists as a social actor. The actions which an agent engages in can be specified in terms of the options available to her in her action-environment. It is this concept that will form the basis of my model of the ontological structure of human agency.

In attempting to specify the nature of an agent's action-environment, the idea of the action-alternatives which are available to an agent in a given situation is the first concept that needs to be discussed. Intuitively, this idea is a perfectly clear one. In a given situation, an agent has a number

of courses of action that she could engage in. For example, in my present situation as a writer of this paper, I can continue writing the paper or I could stop working and attend to other matters, such as paying some bills. Each of these courses of action represents a genuine possibility of how I might act in my current situation.

These reflections show <u>an agent's action-environment in a certain situation</u> is composed, first of all, of a set of <u>action-alternatives</u>, a_i. An action-alternative is simply a course of action that is available to the agent in the situation. I will say that two courses of action a_i and a_j are alternatives in a specific situation if an agent's pursuit of action-alternative a_i in that situation entails that pursuing alternative a_j is foreclosed to her at that time. Thus, my continuing to write this paper at the present time entails that I cannot also go off to the bank to pay my rent. Courses of action are genuine alternatives when an agent's engagement in one of them keeps her from being able to engage in other ones in a specific situation.

This definition uses the idea of a course of action as the basic notion in defining an action-environment. In this sense, an agent's action-environment is defined by alternative courses of actions and not simply single actions that are available to her. Although I will not attempt to specify the scope of such courses of action, in general I will conceptualize an agent's action-alternatives in terms of courses of action that are made up of many single actions. This definition also treats courses of action as alternative to one another only in a context. I am not using any general notion of incompatible action-types, but only of choices in a concrete context that rule out other choices. The incompatibility of action-alternatives is based solely on the fact that an agent cannot pursue all the possibilities that are available to her at a given moment of time.

The idea of 'availability' in this definition covers an important problem, however. The action-alternatives that compose an agent's action-environment cannot be interpreted as the actions which an agent <u>could</u> engage in, if that is taken to mean actions which are physically possible for the agent in a given situation. Such a set of actions is much too wide to constitute an agent's action-environment in the sense that I intend. Although I could, for example, blow up my car by dropping a lighted match into the gas tank, such a course of action is not a genuine action-alternative for me in my present situation since there is no reason for me to do so.

Such a consideration shows that not all the courses of action that an agent could follow in a given situation form genuine action-alternatives for that agent. In order to make sense of a more restrictive notion of an action-alternative, I shall rely on the notion of an agent having a reason to pursue a course of action. I shall say that a course of action is an <u>action-alternative</u> for an agent in a given situation if there is a reason for her to

follow that course of action in the situation in which she finds herself. This specification of the notion of an action-alternative limits that notion to those courses of action that have some actual possibility of being pursued by an agent in a situation.[8]

The second concept that needs to be defined in order to articulate the notion of an agent's action-environment is that of an agent's _assessment_ of her action-alternatives. By introducing this concept into my conceptualization of the ontology of human agency, I acknowledge the fact that human beings act in light of an awareness of the alternatives that they have for acting, but that such an awareness does not always accurately reflect the full set of action-alternatives available to an agent in a situation.

Two points need to be made in this connection. The first is that there are many situations in which an agent may be unaware of all the alternatives for acting that she really has. For example, I might believe that I was not in a position to make an impact on a certain local social policy by writing a letter to my town government when, in fact, had I chosen to write the letter, I would have affected town policy. In such a case, although writing the letter is an action-alternative available to me, I may not regard it as such, seeing it simply as an exercise in futility. Agents do not always understand the full scope of possible courses of action that they could engage in.[9]

The second point is that, although I am conceptualizing an agent's engagement in a course of action as taking place in the context of an understanding of various other alternative courses of action, I wish to avoid the intellectualist fallacy of assuming that every pursuit of a course of action can be represented as a conscious running-through of a set of possible courses of action and the selection of one of them as the one to be engaged in.[10] Although I am claiming that human action takes place within an understanding of certain alternative possibilities, I am not claiming that all such action should be modeled on explicit decision-making. As both Heidegger and the pragmatists have argued, it is crucial to avoid such intellectualist misconceptualizations of human action.

An agent's assessment of her action-environment, then, involves two distinct features. First, there is the understanding that the agent has of the alternative courses of action that are open to her. As I have said, such an understanding needs to be reflected in an explicit conceptualization of alternative courses of action that the agent considers as actually possibilities for acting. Equally important, however, to a full specification of the ontology of human social agency is the agent's _valuation_ of the alternatives which she has. By considering an agent's valuation of her action-alternatives an element of her action-environment, I am conceptualizing the fact that, although agents act for various reasons, such

acting can be thought of as proceeding from some valuing of the course of action which is followed. Such valuation takes different forms in different contexts. An agent may perform an action because she thinks it will bring her great pleasure, indeed, because this action will bring her more pleasure than any other alternative she sees. However, an agent may also perform an action that she thinks is the right thing to do and not worry about the consequences of her action at all. Very different types of valuations of a course of action are possible as grounds for an agent's pursuing a course of action.

The notion of an agent's valuation of the action-alternatives which she has conceptualizes an important aspect of an agent's action-environment. Reflection upon a situation in which an agent makes a decision about what course of action to pursue by actually considering two alternative courses of action will allow the importance of an agent's valuation to emerge. An agent who chooses to go to college, for example, rather than to get married and raise a family, might do so on the basis of her valuation of these different action-alternatives. All sorts of different factors can enter into such a valuation: questions of the desirability of the courses of action themselves; questions of the consequences that will result from pursuing them; even questions about the right mode of conduct for a contemporary women to engage in. All these different sorts of factors result in the agent differentially evaluating these two action-alternatives. Such considerations can lead us to the recognition that the evaluative component of an agent's action-environment is a fundamental to it as the alternatives themselves.

The Definition of "Power Over"

In the previous section of this paper, I developed the concept of an agent's action-environment as a means for conceptualizing the ontological structure of human agency. I am now in a position to present a definition of one agent's power over another agent, one which relies on this ontology for its coherence. Before doing so, however, I would like to take up the distinction between the exercise and possession of power.

The distinction between the exercise and possession of power is one that is of central importance for social theory, but it is one to which social theorists have not always paid close enough attention. Because of their behavioralist and empiricist assumptions, those theorists who have attempted to define the concept of "power over" have concentrated upon the overt exercise of power. Power is not, however, only exercised; it is also possessed. The fact that certain agents in a society possess power over other agents in that society is an important fact about that society and one that cannot be reduced to the fact that such power was actually exercised by the agents in question. An adequate conception of the concept of power

needs to include both the exercise and the possession of power within its purview.

I will therefore begin my own presentation of the concept of "power over" with a definition of the possession of power. Having explored the nature of the definition, I will then go on to provide a definition of the second aspect of 'power over', namely its exercise. With these two definitions, I will have provided the basis for a comprehensive conceptualization of one agent's power over another.

So let me begin with the idea of a possession of 'power over'. Recall that I claimed that the core idea involved in the ascription of "power over" to an agent is the idea of her being able to necessitate some aspect of another agent's activity. The attempt to define the concept of "power over" will involve giving this notion of necessitation more empirical specification. My claim is that the framework of concepts which I developed previously allows me to to just that. I therefore offer the following as a means of specifying the notion of "power over" as necessitating an agent's action:

D 1: A social agent A possesses power over another agent B iff A controls B's action-environment in a fundamental manner.

The first thing to note about this definition of "power over" is that it provides the necessary specification of the idea of necessitation. By using the concept of an agent's action-environment, this definition provides a more concrete way of thinking about how an agent's action can be necessitated, viz. by controlling the agent's action-environment. At the same time, because it does involve the notion of an agent's action-environment, this definition is situated in an ontology of human action that is more comprehensive than that posited by the behavioristically influenced attempts to define "power over" in terms of behavior, decisions, and interests. As such, it provides a more suitable definition of the concept.

This definition of an agent's possession of power is also one which treats power as a capacity which an agent has. An agent possesses power in so far as an agent has control of the action-environment of another agent. But, as I have stressed, the possession of power must be seen to be something distinct from the actual exercise of power. By saying that an agent has power over another agent because he controls the other's action-environment, I allow the possession of power to be based on agent's abilities to take courses of actions that will affect other agents. He need not, however, have taken such courses of action in order for his power to be a social reality. A social agent can possess power over another agent in that he has control of that agent's action-environment without having actually exercised that power in a specific manner. As I shall show in the course of my subsequent discussion, it is very important not to identify the possession of power with a particular manner of its exercise.

So let us look in some more detail at exactly what is entailed by my use of a dispositional notion as the basis of my definition of the possession of power. To say that the possession of power is a dispositional notion is to say that it supports a counterfactual. If I say that an agent has power, I am saying that he <u>could</u> exercise that power <u>if</u> he chose to. The "if" indicates that the actual exercise of power is not the only basis for attributing power to an agent. Even in circumstances where an agent chooses not to exercise her power, she can still be meaningfully said to possess that power.[11]

This definition has a number of features that may seem unintuitive, but which I think are very important. The first is that it conceptualizes the possession of power as non-intentional. Since I have based an agent's possession of power on an ability that he has, an agent does not have to intend anything to have power. Although I shall show that intentions play an important role in constituting many types of power relationship, I have not required that this be the case by definitional stipulation. Similarly, the agent over whom power is possessed does not have to be aware of a power relationship in which he is placed in order for it to be there. Power is possessed over him just in case his action-environment is controlled to a significant extent by another agent. Again, I will show that many forms of power do depend upon the recognition by this agent of the ability of another agent to control his action-environment. This is, however, not something that I have required in my definition, for other forms of power will be effective precisely when they are able to elude the recognition of the agent over whom they are possessed.

At this point, I shall turn to the other aspect of "power over" that I have mentioned, an agent's actual exercise of power. I will define this notion in the following way:

D 2:   An agent <u>A exercises power over</u> an agent <u>B</u> iff <u>A</u> uses his control of <u>B</u>'s action-environment to change it in some fundamental manner.

Here, I present a definition of the exercise of power which treats such an exercise as an occurrent event. When an agent changes in some fundamental way the action-environment that another agent has, the first agent exercises power over the second. An agent's exercise of power is conceptualized here as the realization of the capacity posited in the attribution of power <u>qua</u> possession to that agent.

This manner of conceptualizing the exercise of power by one agent over another is general enough to allow us to distinguish various different ways in which power can be exercised. For example, there are many exercises of power in which one agent changes the action-environment of another agent by means of making some change in a previously given act-

ion-environment. In such cases, power is exercised through a re-structuring of the options open to a given agent. The usual 'forms of power' distinguished by social theorists, and which I will discuss in the sequel, can be conceptualized on the basis of this idea.[12] Not all forms of power, however, take this form. There are, to use a Heideggerian turn of phrase, forms of power that are more 'originary' in that they affect the action-environment of a social agent at a more fundamental level. One of the advantages of this definition is that it allows me to include such 'originary' uses of power within this general conception.[13]

This definition of power, then, is a very broad one. It states that an agent who exercises power over another agent does so by changing the 'circumstances' within which the other agent acts and makes choices. It does not, however, specify exactly how such changes are brought about. Indeed, it is a virtue of this definition that it is so general and that it allows of further specification. Different forms of power can be specified by specifying exactly how the action-environment of an agent is changed. Thus, this definition of power as the general ability of an agent to control another agent's action-environment also serves as the means for defining a variety of forms of power depending on the specific manner in which that action-environment is controlled. Any actual power relationship will be of a more specific character than the general type posited by this definition. It will show the different ways in which the necessitation of an agent's action can be brought about.

The task to which I shall now turn is that of developing such a typology of specific 'forms of power'. In so doing, I will be attempting to distinguish different ways in which power can be a factor in social relationships. Although I shall be guided by the manner in which ordinary language distinguishes between such concepts as force and coercion, my aim is not to provide a systematic account of the use of such terms within ordinary language. The aim of my account is to provide a set of theoretical tools for use within social theory. This theoretical account will therefore not always mesh perfectly with the use of such concepts within ordinary discourse.

Force

The first form of power that I shall discuss is that of force. I will define a relationship of force in the following way:

D 3: A's power over B is an instance of force iff A physically keeps B from pursuing an action-alternative that B has reason to pursue or makes B's body behave in a way that B would avoid if possible.

The idea here is that force generally achieves its ends by keeping an agent from doing what she wishes. A force relationship relies on the

physical ability of an agent to keep another agent from doing what she would prefer to do or to get something to happen to the agent that she would prefer did not. A simple example of force is the parent who forcibly opens a child's mouth and pours some medicine down the child's throat, despite the continuous attempt by the child to resist taking the medicine.

As I have indicated, the notion of force that I have defined is not meant to capture all the uses of the word "force" in English. The word "force" is used in a variety of contexts including those which I shall conceptualize under the idea of coercive power. I shall use the word "force" in a more restricted sense, one which posits a specific mechanism of necessitation. Force, as a form of power, is thus a specific theoretical concept, though one which has its roots within ordinary discourse.

The first thing that ought to be noticed about force, in my theoretical sense, is that a force relation only exists through its exercise. Although one may possess a means of force, such a means is only a factor in $\underline{B}$'s action-environment - at the level of force itself - if it is actually being exercised. I say, "at the level of force itself", because the possibility of being able to force someone to do, or refrain from doing, something may ground more complex relations of power. However, as a basic form of power, force itself only exists in being exercised. It is the most basic way in which one agent is able to alter the action-environment of another agent and exists only as an occurrent event.

A second distinctive feature of force is that it is mostly negative in its mode of appearing. It is much easier to use force to keep an agent from doing something than it is to get something to happen to that agent. Although one of the most frequent uses of force is in the relationship between parents and their children, such force is most often used in negative ways, keeping the child from performing actions that the parents do not want him to perform, and only in rare cases, as the one mentioned above, in getting the child's body to behave in a manner that the child seeks to avoid. Such examples of the negative structure of force abound. For example, when an employer locks his employees out of a plant, he is using force to keep them from working.[14] Similarly, when a saboteur ties up someone to keep him from revealing the existence of a bomb that he has just discovered, the saboteur is using force to keep the agent from acting on his discovery.

Although the saboteur's tying up his victim is a clear example of a use of force, not all uses of force involve such direct physical targeting of another's body. One can also use force to attack the physical possessions of another. For example, if the saboteur were planning to blow up his enemy's means of transportation, he would be planning to use force, but not directly on the body of his enemy. Force can have as its immediate

object either the body of the agent itself or possessions which the agent uses as a means to acting.

A crucial feature of the use of force is that it does not involve a mutual understanding between two agents: "Force" conceptualizes solely an external relationship between two agents. Rather than trying to change another's mind, in an exercise of force an agent seeks to keep another agent from being able to act. The one on whom force is used is placed in a situation in which her desire is not capable of satisfaction; her situation is changed, but it is changed by her being placed in a situation in which she is no longer able to use the same means of action as she previously could. In this sense, one can speak of force as requiring an objectification of a human being, for the human being on whom force is used is being treated as an object whose actions must be hindered, much as one might keep a rock from falling.[15]

This analysis of the structure of force relations lets us see that force is not as a pervasive a phenomenon as it is often assumed to be. While exercises of force can be used to 'back up' more complex power relations, because of their 'uneconomic' character, they are not efficient means of affecting other people.[16] To use force, one must exert oneself, extend oneself, in order to keep the other from doing what they would otherwise do. But this means, as I have argued, that force only exists when it is actually being exercised, a feature of force that distinguishes it from other forms of power.[17]

Coercive Power

Coercive power is the second form of power that I shall discuss. The target of coercive power is the set of action-alternatives that constitute one aspect of an agent's action-environment. When an agent is in a position to use a resource or ability to affect the situation of another agent, then a situation exists in which that agent can exercise coercive power. Coercive power can be exercised by an agent, however, only if she uses her ability to alter the set of action-alternatives available to an agent as the basis for threatening her victim.

Coercive power can only be exercised by an agent, however, when the threat that she makes is effective that is, when it is recognized by the threatened agent and gets that agent to alter her anticipated course of action. Otherwise, although the threatening agent will be able to harm the threatened agent, the relationship between them will not be constituted at the level of coercive power. I will therefore adopt the following definition of coercive power:

D 4:   A social agent $\underline{A}$ exercises <u>coercive power</u> over social agent $\underline{B}$ iff (1) $\underline{A}$ has the ability to affect $\underline{B}$ in a significant way; (2) $\underline{A}$ threatens to do so unless $\underline{B}$ acts in a certain way; and (3) $\underline{B}$ accedes to $\underline{A}$'s threat and alters his course of action.[18]

To illustrate the nature of coercive power, let us turn to an example that is often used in this context, namely that of a thief with a gun. Because of her possession of a gun, such a thief is able to alter the action-alternatives that are available to her intended victim. It is this fact that allows her to threaten her victim, and it is the threat which constitutes the basis of the coercive power relationship between a thief and her victim. When the victim understands that the thief is able to harm him, that the thief intends to do so unless he complies, then the ground is prepared for the exercise of coercive power.

To see how coercive power works in more detail, let us consider the pre-threat action-environment of the intended victim. For the sake of this example, let us suppose that the intended victim possesses \$ 100 and that it is the intention of the thief to rob him for this amount. Let us also suppose that the victim's pre-threat situation can be reduced to the following two action-alternatives, either to buy a train ticket for \$ 100 in order to visit his sick mother or to spend the \$ 100 on a new sports coat.

Schematically, I shall represent the victim's pre-threat situation in the following way. First, our victim's initial situation (S_o) is simply that of possessing \$ 100 or:

$$S_o = 100.$$

Our victim's current situation can be represented as a transformation from S_o to S_1, where the latter is itself composed of two alternatives A_1 and A_2

$$S_o \rightarrow S_1 \quad \begin{cases} \rightarrow A_1 = -100 \text{ and } m \\ \rightarrow A_2 = -100 \text{ and } c \end{cases}$$

where $\underline{m}$ stands for "visiting mother", and $\underline{c}$ for "buying a sports coat". In such a case, let us suppose that our social agent will base his decision on the relative desirability of $\underline{m}$ and $\underline{c}$. Depending on which action-alternative he chooses, different consequences will result and our agent is able to decide how to act on the basis of his own preferences.

Now let us consider what happens once the thief enters the scene with her gun and makes the following threat: "Give me your money or I'll shoot you."[19] I shall interpret this threat as an assertion by the thief of an ability to interrupt the sequence $S_o \rightarrow S_1$ by interposing TS_o where TS_o is itself composed of two branches:

$$t_1 = -100 \text{ and } -s$$
$$t_2 = 100 \text{ and } s$$

where $\underline{s}$ stands for "being shot". The idea is that the threat changes the action-alternatives that $\underline{B}$ faces in S_o. Only by choosing to defy the threat, i.e. to opt for t_2, can $\underline{B}$ still be in a position to actualize S_1, though he must not do so with the additional cost of $\underline{s}$. I shall represent this situation in our schema as follows:

$$S_o \rightarrow TS_o \begin{cases} t_1 \rightarrow -S_1 \\ t_2 \rightarrow S_1 \end{cases}$$

in other words, the alternatives the victim now faces are transformed by the threat made by the thief into one in which he is not shot but no longer has the funds at his disposal, and one in which he is shot but still has his $ 100 to use as he chooses.[20]

This analysis of the effect that a threat has upon the action-environment of an intended victim allows us to see a number of conditions that are necessary for an agent to exercise coercive power over another agent. The first is that the threatening agent $\underline{A}$ must have some means at her disposal through which she is able to affect the situation of the subordinate agent $\underline{B}$ in a manner that $\underline{B}$ is unable to counter, in the present case, it is the thief's possession of a gun that constitutes her ability to affect $\underline{B}$ and thus to change her action-alternatives. Second, $\underline{A}$ must be able to communicate to $\underline{B}$ her ability to affect him. This condition is important, for it shows that, even in situations of coercion, the agents involved must share an understanding of the significance of their interaction, of what is at stake for them. What is important here is that the coercing agent be able to communicate to the coerced agent her ability to differentially affect his situation depending upon how he reacts to her demands. This is a somewhat complexly structured interaction, one whose rules are not as self-evident as some social theorists have assumed.[21] Third, $\underline{B}$ must have reason to believe not just that $\underline{A}$ has the ability to affect his situation adversely, but that $\underline{A}$ has reason to do so should he fail to comply with the threat. Without this condition, there would be no reason for the victim to take the threat seriously. He might simply think, for example, that the 'thief' was really a friend of his, playing a practical joke on him. In such a case, the 'victim' would not have a reason for taking the threat seriously, although he might play along with the 'game', i.e. act as if he believed the threat. Finally, the negative consequences that $\underline{A}$ is able to inflict upon $\underline{B}$ must be sufficiently undesirable that they outweigh the benefits that would have accrued to $\underline{B}$ in the absence of $\underline{A}$'s threat. In our example, this means that not being shot $(-\underline{s})$ must be preferable to visiting mother $(\underline{m})$ and buying a sport coat $(\underline{c})$. If, to change the example,

the victim was going to use the money in his pocket to pay for an operation to restore the sight of his son and he had no other means of paying for the operation, he might refuse to accede to the threats of the thief. In this case, the threat, although taken seriously, would not be capable of gaining the victim's compliance. In such a case, $\underline{A}$ could still act on her threat to harm $\underline{B}$, but she would be unable to exercise coercive power over him.

I have just outlined four conditions that are necessary for the exercise of coercive power.[22] When these conditions are satisfied, there is a situation in which there is reason for $\underline{B}$ to accede to the demand implicit in $\underline{A}$'s threat that he perform a certain action. It is important, however, to stress the voluntaristic nature of $\underline{B}$'s compliance. $\underline{B}$ must choose to let $\underline{A}$'s threat affect his behavior. While $\underline{A}$ may be able to harm $\underline{B}$ without $\underline{B}$'s compliance, $\underline{A}$ is able to exercise coercive power over $\underline{B}$ only through $\underline{B}$'s own decision to accede to $\underline{A}$'s threat. Coercive power cannot literally force an agent to do anything. Its manner of 'necessitation' is different from that of force. An agent who wishes to exercise coercive power can make the consequences of doing things different from what they would be for the other agent; the victim of coercive power is nonetheless able to make choices about how to act in response to the threat that he faces. He may choose to act in a confrontational manner rather than in a subservient one. The response to a coercive situation is not fully determined by the coercing agent; the consequences for the coerced agent of pursuing those responses are, however, fundamentally altered by the coercing agent. This point is crucial, for it allows us to see that there is always room for the threatened agent to refuse to go along with what the threatening agent demands.

As I have said, groups can also function as the agents who exercise power or who have power exercised over them. One example of a group exercising power is provided by Alexander Cockburn's discussion of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) coercion of Michael Manley in Jamaica.[23] According to Cockburn, Manley pursued a series of policies that caused a great deal of displeasure in Washington. Among these were the attempt "to get a better price from the multinationals for Jamaica's bauxite" and "increased government spending on social programs". As a result of a variety of actions by the "local and international bourgeoisie", Manley was placed in a situation where he needed to borrow money and the IMF was the only available source. According to Cockburn, the fund was willing to lend money to Manley, but only if he was willing to meet their terms: "The fund's terms included a ceiling on wages, devaluations running as high as 50 percent over time and cuts in government spending." The funds imposition of these terms amounts to a coercive threat: Either implement these policies or we will not lend you money. The fund's possession of money was the resource that allowed them to make a threat to Manley.

Although he tried to avoid borrowing on these terms, Manley was eventual-
ly "forced" to borrow money from the fund in order to keep his country
afloat and, in order to do so, he had to accept the terms set by the IMF.
But what this meant was that the IMF was able to coerce Manley into
adopting an action-scenario that he had not wanted to accept.[24]

At this point, then, I have shown the basic structure that constitutes a
social agent's coercive power over another agent. This basic structure is
the ability of one agent to alter the action-environment within which an-
other agent acts. When there is a basic asymmetry between two agents
that results in one agent's having such an ability to alter the other's
action-alternatives, then there is a situation in which coercive social power
can be brought into existence.

This account of coercive power allows us to see the limitations of the view
that social relationships are always constituted by agreements or under-
standings among the agents that make them up. In one sense, I agree that
social agreements, i.e. social practises, set the contexts within which
agents act. As opposed to social theories that limit themselves to cognizing
human behavior, my account moves from the beginning in the realm of
human intentional actions. However, this does not mean that power is not
itself a factor that can be wielded within a practice. As we have seen, a
practice can itself be so constituted that one agent is able to determine the
context within which another agent acts without that agent being similarly
able to determine the context of the former agent. This is what is meant by
coercive social power.[25]

The Productivity of Coercion

At this point in my discussion of the forms of power, I would like to pause
in order to compare the nature of force and coercion. The basic feature of
coercion that I would like to highlight is that, unlike force, it has the
ability to use the subordinate agent's actions for the benefit of the super-
ordinate agent. It is in this sense that I will claim that coercive power is
productive.

To understand what I mean by the productive nature of coercive power,
let me once more make reference to the distinction between the possession
of power and its exercise. One can say of a social agent that he has power
over another agent without thereby claiming that he has actually exercised
that power. The possession of power refers to a capacity which an agent
has, her ability to affect the situation of another agent should she choose
to. But a capacity is not identical with its actual occurrent uses. One's
ability to read is not identical with all the times one has actually read;
neither is one's power identical with all the times one has exercised it in
specific situations.[26] Such is the logic of capacities.

The general point I have made in terms of 'power' holds equally well for coercive power. One can speak of an agent's coercive power, i.e. an agent's ability to coerce another agent should she choose to, without thereby implying that she has actually exercised that power.

In my discussion of force, I have already argued that this general point does not hold. Although an agent may be in a position to use force should she choose to, this position cannot be conceptualized as 'possessing' force. Force only exists in its exercise. One may possess the 'means of force', but one does not thereby possess force itself.

In discussing force, I pointed out that force was a predominantly 'negative' form of power; it could keep an agent from performing certain actions, but it could not get an agent to <u>do</u> anything. Once an agent actually acted, the form of power at issue was necessarily something other than force itself. Although the possibility of the use of force could ground an agent's acting so as to avoid such a use, this sort of action takes place in the logical space of coercive power rather than force.[27]

But this also means that coercive power is able to get an agent to do something. The logic of a threat is precisely that it posits a result which an agent is able to forestall by <u>acting</u> in an appropriate manner. What I now want to point out is that this situation is productive in two senses. First, it <u>produces actions</u> by the subordinate agent who is seeking to keep a threat from being realized. I have already spoken of this aspect of co- ercive power by stressing its 'positive' form in contrast to force. But co- ercive power is productive in a second sense. Because the subordinate agent performs certain actions, he can actually <u>produce something</u> which the superordinate agent is able to appropriate. That is to say, coercive power results in the production of certain benefits which the superordinate agent can reap.

This difference in the productivity of coercive power and force is rein- forced by another difference: In the case of force, the superordinate agent must actually use his resources and abilities to block the subordinate agent's actions. With force, there is an expenditure of resources that is required to realize the force relation. The exercise of coercive power, however, does not require any significant new expenditure of energy or resources on the part of the superordinate agent: <u>If</u> the superordinate agent is in the position to make an effective threat, he can receive bene- fits from the productive nature of coercion without himself expending energy or resources.

This distinction between force and coercive power explains one reason why force is not as pervasive a phenomenon in the social world as the threat of its use. The actual use of force requires an expenditure of energy and

resources that is not required when force is simply threatened. Although a superordinate will often have to use force as a means of convincing the subordinate agent that his threat is one that he will actually realize if necessary, such uses of force are manly symbolic, i.e. intended as a means of conveying an intention and not actually attempts to change the subordinate agent's action-environment.[28]

But although an exercise of coercive power differs from the use of force in regard to their productivity, there is one respect in which they are similar: both occasion the existence of resistance. By resistance, I mean the attempt by the subordinate agent to change her circumstances in regard to the superordinate agent so as to diminish the superordinate agent's power over her. It is important to realize that exercises of coercive power are as likely to produce a form of resistance as the exercise of force. The coerced agent, so long as she remains aware of her status as coerced, is aware that power is being exercised over her.[29] As such, she realizes that she is not free to pursue the actions that she would like to. And this fact produces feelings of resentment and the desire to break free of the yoke of coercive power. It is for this reason that coercing agents do not remain content with the possession of coercive power by it-self, but must seek to develop misunderstandings among the coerced about what is happening to them. Marxist theories of ideology are, for example, theories that seek to expose such miscognition and show how coercion is concealed by them.

But this means that there is a tendency for superordinate agents to seek to enlarge the various forms of power which they have over an agent. In so far, for example, as they only possess coercive power over an agent, their relation will be conditioned by the fear of possible resistance. The attempt to expand the means whereby their power is constituted follows from the nature of the forms of power themselves.

The Concept of Influence

Influence is the most problematic of the forms of power which I will analyze. My previous discussion anticipates the need to see influence as a third means of necessitating an agent's actions, for I argued that coercive power sought a form of power that would not engender resistance. It is precisely the 'virtue' of influence as a form of power that it does not engender such resistance. As I proceed with my analysis I shall show why this is so.

The problems involving the concept of influence emerge once one begins to reflect on the wide range of phenomena all of which fall under this con-cept. At the one extreme, there are cases in which one agent simply supplies another agent with a piece of information that affects the decision that the former agent makes about which course of action to pursue; at

the other, there are cases of charismatic influence in which the charismatic individual is able to get another agent to do anything that he wishes. Since the latter sort of example seems to be a clear case of the use of power whereas the former does not, I need to be able to draw the line between those cases of influence in which power is exercised and those in which it is not. In order to resolve these problems, I shall first look at the concept of influence in general and, once I have defined that notion, I will discuss the relation between influence and power.

In general, the distinctive feature of influence is that it occurs through the acceptance by the subordinate agent of something which the super-ordinate agent tells her. As in cases of coercion, influence proceeds on the basis of a mutual understanding. Here, however, the understanding has to do with information conveyed to the subordinate agent. In order to clarify this idea, I shall define influence in the following manner:

D 5: An agent <u>A influences</u> another agent <u>B</u> iff <u>A</u> provides <u>B</u> with some putative information which results in <u>B</u> altering his assessment of his action-environment in a fundamental manner.

When a student comes to me, for example, and says that she is interested in pursuing philosophy as a career, I have an opportunity to influence her decision. I can do this in a number of ways. For example, if I think that it would be a mistake for her to pursue this option at all, given my assessment of her abilities and the job market, I may try to convince her that she would be better off choosing some other sort of career. If I succeed in doing that, I will have influenced her by convincing her that the action-alternative that she saw as most desirable, namely pursuing a career as a philosopher, was one that really was much less desirable than she had thought. By either showing her aspects of that alternative that she had not noticed or convincing her that she would not be able to follow it as easily as she thought, I would cause her to reassess the desirability of that option.

To see the specific nature of influence, consider the difference between this situation and one in which I might use coercive power. For example, if the student insisted on applying to graduate school and I threatened her by saying that, if she insisted in applying to graduate schools, I would write a bad letter of recommendation to those to which she did apply, but that if she did not do so, I would help her pursue some other career option, I would also be exercising coercive power rather than influence over the student. This is because I would be using my ability to change the likelihood of her being able to pursue the option that she had chosen to pursue as the basis for my threat. Although I would be attempting to <u>influence</u> the graduate schools not to accept her, I would actually be attempting to exercise <u>coercive power</u> over the student herself by changing her action-environment.[30]

This example brings out an important aspect of influence, namely its role in the constitution of coercive power relations. Although this is a theme that requires more extensive treatment than I can give it in the present context, let me just call attention to the structure of the example I have just given. In it, coercive power is exercised through the use of influence. Because I have the ability to influence the graduate schools not to accept my student (assuming that my efforts in that direction would be successful), I could exercise coercive power over her, that is, be able to change her action-environment (assuming at this point that she would have gotten into the school without a negative recommendation from me). What this example therefore shows us is precisely how influence can function as a possible ground of coercive power.

It is important to realize that influence can proceed either by affecting an agent's assessment of the options that she already sees as existing for her, as in the case I have just considered, or by getting the agent to enlarge (or decrease) the set of action-alternatives within her assessment. To stick to the example of advising a student on a career choice, I might be able to influence the student to not pursue a career in philosophy by showing her that there was a program in journalism for which she would have a good chance of being accepted and which would better suit her talents and temperament. If she had never thought of this as a career that she could pursue, my mentioning it to her might influence her to take it seriously and to eventually decide to give up philosophy. In so doing, I would change her assessment of her action-environment by getting to see the existence of an option that was not previously apparent to her. My influence would proceed from my ability to convince my student that there was an option for her career that she had not considered.

This example brings us to a further question about influence. What accounts for the influence that an influencing agent has over an influenced one? Recall that in the case of force, there was an inequality in strength that accounted for the ability of one agent to affect another, while in the case of coercive power there was a resource or ability that the coercing agent possessed. In the case of influence, there is also such a factor: the influencing agent has some knowledge or skill, at least in the perception of the influenced agent, that allows him to convince her that she should alter her conception of her situation. In all cases of influence, there must be some ground that the influenced agent has for allowing herself to be influenced by the influencing agent, whether that ground be a conscious reason or an unconscious motive. The influenced agent has faith in the claims made by the influencing agent and this constitutes the ground of his influence over her.

With this observation, we are brought back to the recognition that very different types of cases all fall under the scope of the concept of

influence. As I mentioned, on the extreme there are cases in which one agent simply brings something to the attention of another agent which causes that agent to alter her evaluation of her situation, but which she would have used on her own, had she had access to it. For example, I might influence a student's career choice by pointing out some statistics that she did not have access to. Had she had access to these statistics, she would have reached the same evaluation as she did as a result of my influence over her. In such cases, the influencing agent merely serves as a means of access to information, making no substantive contribution to the influenced agent's reassessment of her situation. The influenced agent processes the new information - and its impact on her action-environment - on her own. These are the sorts of cases in which one might be hesitant to attribute power to the influencing agent. The reason for this is that we do not think that the changes brought about by the influencing agent in the influenced agent's action-environment amount to a restriction of the agent's agency, do not necessitate the agent's action. My definition of power stated that the superordinate agent had to control the action-environment of the subordinate agent for the relation between them to be one in which power was an issue. Cases of influence where this does not occur are simply not cases of the exercise of power.

Such cases contrast markedly with cases in which the contribution of the influencing agent is much more substantive. One only has to think of the typical Hollywood scenario in which an unprincipled gigolo is able to influence a young woman in love with him to give him money for some investment that will supposedly bring the young woman great wealth but which the gigolo really uses to finance some other love affair. In such cases, the mere fact that the influencing agent says that the influenced agent should do something is sufficient to get her to do it; she exhibits no independent rational processes of deliberation or assessment whatsoever. Because of her love for the influencing agent, the young woman is unable to question his motives for doing anything and simply accedes to his wishes as a measure of her love for him. Here, the influencing agent has a much more substantive control of the influenced agent's understanding or valuation of her action-environment. Because the influenced agent's trust of the influencing agent is so extreme, she will act as he wishes, regardless of the wisdom of so doing; she has no independent will of her own and her action is thus necessitated.[31] In my terms, this means that she makes her action-environment into a reflection of the desires of the influencing agent, an adjustment that does amount to control of her options for acting.

There will be a variety of types of cases in which a case of influence is also an exercise of power. I have already looked at examples of charismatic influence and seen that it is one such form of power via influence. Another, that I shall investigate in more detail in a moment, is manipulation.

Here too, I shall say that this type of influence is necessarily an exercise of an agent's power.

The distinctive nature of influence as a form of power is something that Spinoza recognized in his Tractatus-Politicus. In that work, Spinoza distinguishes among a variety of different forms of power:

"One man has another in his power when he holds him in bonds; when he has disarmed him and deprived him of the means of self-defense or escape; when he has inspired him with fear; or when he has bound him so closely by a service that he would rather please his benefactor than himself, and rather be guided by his benefactor's judgment than by his own. The man who has another in his power in the first or second way holds his body only, not his mind; whereas he who controls another in the third or fourth way has made the mind as well as the body of the other subject to his right; but only while the fear or hope remain." (Spinoza 1958, ch.II, §10, 273-4)[32]

I quote this passage because Spinoza makes one point in it that is important to our current discussion: that influence as a form of power requires that the influenced agent cede her judgment to that of the influencing agent. I have tried to capture this notion by claiming that those cases of influence in which the influencing agent controls the influenced agent's assessment of her action-environment are those in which power is involved.

Another important point that Spinoza makes in this passage is that influence is a much securer form of power since the subject of influence willingly does what he does. In the case of coercion on the other hand, as Spinoza points out, while the subject chooses to act as a result of his perception of the ability of the coercing agent to harm him, he still would rather do otherwise. Spinoza's observation brings home the point that influence is an even more secure form of power than coercive power; for, so long as the influenced agent does not have grounds to question the role of the influencing agent, he will willingly do all that is asked of him.

Manipulation

As I mentioned during my discussion of influence, manipulation is one of the sub-types of influence in which power is also exercised. This view contradicts the idea that manipulation is a fundamentally distinct form of power from influence. The distinction between manipulation and power, in my view, is simply that, in cases of manipulation, the superordinate agent not only influences the subordinate agent but does so by concealing the grounds for his action. In cases of manipulation, there is always something that the superordinate agent is keeping from the subordinate agent. It is this cognitive component that characterizes manipulation as a particular form of influence in which power is always at stake.

I will define the concept of manipulation in the following way:

D 6: An agent <u>A</u> <u>manipulates</u> another agent <u>B</u> iff <u>A</u> influences <u>B</u> for purposes or ends that she keeps concealed from <u>B</u>.

The example of the young woman and the gigolo which I presented a moment ago is a perfect example of a manipulative power relation. Because the gigolo was using his influence over the young woman for his own advantage while keeping this fact concealed from the young woman, he has manipulated her. Indeed, it is presumably necessary to his manipulation that the reason for his actions be kept from the woman.

Normally, manipulation will succeed at some cost to the subordinate agent, although this need not be the case. When Fairfax Rochester attempts to get Jane Eyre to fall in love with him by pretending that he is going to marry someone else, his actions are an instance of influence in the form of manipulation. It is influence because Rochester believes correctly that Eyre will come to recognize her love for him if she sees him courting someone else; but it is also a case of manipulation because he is trying to influence her by courting the other women and keeps this aspect of his actions from her. Manipulation is a form of influence in which the influenced agent is kept in the dark by the manipulating agent about the actual reasons for his actions.

I use this example to help explain the concept of manipulation because it shows that manipulation need not aim at harming the manipulated agent, although it is true that it often does so. Rochester's manipulation of Eyre's feelings are seeking to help her rather than to harm her, to make her aware of her love for him, a love that will be requited once she has acknowledged its existence. This shows that it is a mistake to tie the notion of power to the notion of the subordinate agent's interests, as Lukes wishes to.[33] Power can be exercised over an agent in the interest of that agent.[34]

The Articulation of Power

In this paper, I have presented a general definition of power which I have then used as the basis for developing a typology of various forms of power. I have distinguished three main forms of power: force, coercion, and influence. I have shown how each of these forms of power can be understood as a specification of the general definition of power. Further, I have shown that coercion is a more productive form of power than force, while influence secures its ends in a more subtle manner, one less likely to engender resistance.

Given the manner in which I have proceeded, it would be natural to conclude that a single action can exemplify only a single type of power.

This is not the case, however. Indeed, it is another aim of this paper to argue that power is essentially articulated, i.e. that relationship of power are simultaneously constituted through the various forms of power that I have presented in my typology.

One reason why my discussion has encouraged the idea that power exists only in a specific 'form' is that I have conducted my discussion by means of the formula "A has power over B", a formula that does not capture the structure of most actual power relationships. The superordinate agent in a power relationship is often not simply superordinate over a single other agent, but has a multiple set of power relations to other agents. This fact alone allows us to see that actually existing power in the social world normally has a more articulated structure than my typology suggests.

But to really see the articulated nature of social power, let us consider a single action that exhibits all the forms of power which I have delineated. The action that I have in mind is the bombing of Libya that President Reagan ordered in the spring of 1986. Assuming that one aim of that action was to actually kill Qaddafi, then, in regard to Qaddafi, the U.S. used force to try to kill him. This is a use of force directly on the body of the subordinate agent. Even if the U.S. did not attempt to kill Qaddafi him-self, the U.S. did use force on the armed forces of Libya in an attempt to limit Qaddafi's ability to mount attacks. Here is a second type of power relation. The third type of power relation emerges when one considers the effect this action was intended to have on other 'terrorist' nations: It was intended to make them realize that terrorist acts against the United States would be met with in a similar fashion. In other words, the U.S. was trying to get such nations to see that it would be willing to use force to retaliate against such actions. Depending on how one views this, the U.S. was either making a threat here, or else trying to influence these nations, in an attempt to get them to cease from supporting terrorist activities. Finally, if one considers the American public, this action was an attempt to show them that the U.S. would not be intimidated by terrorism, and thus was an attempt to influence public opinion in favor of Reagan's policies.[35]

As a result of this discussion, it becomes clear that power is a complex social reality, whose actual existence in the social world is more multi-faceted than our previous discussion would have suggested. One and the same action can function as various types of power relationship, depending on which subordinate agent is being considered. Power thus has a manifold structure of existence, able at one time to appear in different guises to different agents.

Previously, I claimed that power relationships tend to engender resistance. When they are perceived by an agent as an attempt to get her to serve

another, they are likely to meet with that agent's resistance, the desire to act as she sees fit, independently of the effects of the other. But this means that a power relationship between two agents will be more secure if the superordinate agent is able to have at his command a variety of means to affect the action-environment of the subordinate agent. He can then, like the proverbial magician, dip into his bag to tricks when any particular strategy fails. Articulating a single power relationship over one agent gives a superordinate agent a greater degree of control over that agent's beliefs and actions than he would have in the presence of simply one form of power as represented by my typology.[36]

Conclusion

In this paper, I have presented a definition of what it is for one agent to have power over another agent. I have argued that such power consists in the ability of the superordinate agent to control the subordinate agent's action-environment. Proceeding from this definition, I have developed a typology of different forms of power, different ways in which this general definition can be realized in specific power relations. I have distinguished force from coercion and influence, and shown the very different natures of these forms of power. I have also shown that manipulation is a different mode in which such power can be realized.

My aim in so doing has been to show that power is a more variegated presence in the social world than reliance on a simple definition would indicate. Indeed, I have argued that power is itself articulated, that it exists in various different forms in one and the same action.

By means of this idea, I have meant to highlight the fact that the typology of forms of power which I have developed in this paper only begins to develop a theoretical account of the structure of power in actually existing relationships. An account of the reality of power in the social world would require that one investigate how these ideal types come to exist as factors in the social world that human social agents encounter. The account of power that I have presented in this paper is but a first step in such an overall account of social power, one that allows us to see the differing ways in which power can be a factor in the lives of human social agents.[37]

Notes

1 The distinction between "power over" and "power to" is a common one in social theory. This paper explores the former locution only.

2 In 1963, p. 80.

3 Lukes 1974 is an influential discussion of some of these attempts.

4 Some social theorists such as Foucault would claim that the contrast between necessitation and free choice which I employ here is itself suspect. For the purpose of this paper, I will simply assume the adequacy of this contrast, one that itself certainly stands in need of defense.

5 For one account of the inadequacies of previous attempts to define "power over", see Terence Ball 1975. However, unlike me, Ball rejects the entire project of defining a concept of "power over". I address this issue in my 1987.

6 For the purpose of this paper, I will use the imprecise term "group" as a shorthand for various different forms of social collectivities.

7 Lukes 1974, 39. Lukes' usage follows Dahl's in 1957.

8 In this definition, an agent may have a reason to pursue an action that she is not aware of as being a possibility for her to pursue. This raises certain epistemic difficulties, ones that I think are not problematic. It simply means that the specification of an agent's action-alternatives cannot be conclusively made from the point of view of the agent.

9 This problem is even more marked in social contexts where the co-ordination of other agents is required for an action being effected.

10 I want to thank Jay Garfield for calling this problem to my attention and, thereby, saving me from serious errors.

11 Although counterfactual conditionals are often problematic, I do not think that they are so in this instances. Since the only circumstances that can be changed in this particular counterfactual are the desires of the agent who possesses power, this definition does not encounter many of the problems usually associated with the use of such conditionals.

12 For an example of a typology of various forms of power, see Lukes 1974.

13 The idea here is that structural analyses of power can also be accommodated within the framework that I have just articulated.

14 On my view, an agent who locks a thief out of his house is using force against that agent. Such force is, however, legitimate.

15 I owe this way of making my point to Paul Ricoeur.

16 The notion of an "economy" of power is one that Foucault 1975 uses to talk about power. The present analysis is meant to capture some of the essentials of his analysis without having to treat power as a substance that has autonomous existence and interests, as Foucault seems to. The use of the term "economy" is also similar to Freud's use of that term in regard to the drives. See, for example, Freud 1920, ch. 18.

17 This point is noted by Lively 1976, 8.

18   In this paper, I shall ignore the idea of coercive offers. For an interesting discussion of this concept, see Nozick 1969, and Häyry/Airaksinen in this issue.

19   A full account of the effect of the threat would have to consider the likelihood of an agent being harmed by the maker of the threat. At this point, we shall simply treat the threat as having a categorial effect, weakening this assumption in our further discussion.

20   It may seem artificial to consider a situation in which the victim is able to retain his money if he refuses to accede to the coercing agent's threat. However, I portray the case this way because it gives the agent more incentive to resist the coercion than those cases in which the negative effect will accrue to the victim regardless of the action-alternative he chooses.

21   Dennis Wrong, in his interesting analysis of power, 1979, cites this as an example of a 'universal' response to weapons, thus failing to see that there is an important element of mutual understanding that lies at the basis of the coercive relation thus constituted.

22   These four conditions have certain similarities to Blau's conditions necessary for an exchange that results in the creation of power. In this sense, I agree with his idea that power is created by the 'rational' response of the victim. Rationality does not, however, as Blau seems to believe, imply legitimacy. See his 1986.

23   In 1986. All subsequent quotations are from this article.

24   A full discussion of this example would require a more full discussion of the bases of social power. For my purposes, I only wish to show that a group, namely the IMF, is able to function as an agent in a coercive power relationship.

25   The account we have just presented could be amplified by developing various features of coercive power, e.g. the scope of the actions controlled by an agent, the cost of controlling such actions, etc. For our present purposes, however, there is no need to do so.

26   Wrong 1979, ch. 2, claims that this distinction has not been observed by power theorists.

27   Recognition of this fact guides Hegel's discussion of the distinction between the lordship-bondage relationship and the life-and-death struggle. I shall discuss this in another paper.

28   A full discussion of this point would require a distinction between literal and symbolic uses of force.

29   Ongoing relations of coercion differ from single events of coercion in how much resistance they are likely to engender.

30   This discussion anticipates the development of what I call the "articulated nature of power relations", a theme that I develop in the final section of this paper.

31   A more complete typology of forms of power would have to use these remarks as the basis for distinguishing among different forms of influence.

32   I would like to thank Paul Ricoeur for calling this work to my attention.

33   Lukes 1974.

34   Despite the fact that an agent's manipulation of another may aim at
     benefitting that other agent, manipulation remains a morally suspect
     social practice. This is true for two reasons. The first is that one can
     never be sure that the influenced agent is not being treated as, in
     Kantian terms, an end-in-itself. The instrumental use of another is
     morally suspect. The second reason that manipulation is morally
     suspect is that the possibility of self-deception is so great in such
     contexts. An agent can easily believe that his manipulation of another
     will result in her making a better choice than she would make in the
     absence of such manipulation. However, this may not be the case.

35   In this example, I am simply relying on the most general understanding
     of the aims of the U.S. in bombing Libya. Whether the U.S.'s
     assertions about Libya were justified or not is a question I leave
     aside.

36   Wrong 1979 argues for a similar claim.

37   Earlier versions of this paper have been read to the Philosophy
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     Massachusetts, and Munich. The present version has benefitted sub-
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