Analyse & Kritik

Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory

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2001 (23) Issue 1



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Table of Contents

Title: Collective Political Action. A Research Program and Some of Its Results
Author: Karl-Dieter Opp
Page: 1-20

Abstract: This paper describes a research program that focuses on the explanation of political protest and its causes. The starting point is Mancur Olson's theory of collective action. This theory is modified, extended and applied to explain political protest. In particular, it is argued that only a wide version of Rational Choice theory that includes "soft" incentives as well as misperception is capable of providing valid explanations of protest behavior. Another part of the research program is the utilization of survey research to test the predictions about protest behavior that are generated from the wide version of Rational Choice theory. The research program further aims at (a) comparing empirically Rational Choice and alternative propositions, (b) providing micro-macro explanatory models, (c) dynamic theoretical models, and (d) explaining preferences and beliefs which are usually treated as exogenous variables. The paper further reports some results of the research program.

Title: Spontanität oder Reflexion? Die Wahl des Informationsverarbeitungsmodus in Entscheidungssituationen
Author: Jörg-Peter Schräpler
Page: 21-42

Abstract: Jeder Handlungsentscheidung eines Akteurs ist eine besondere Definition der Situation vorgeschaltet, welche erst die Präferenzen und Erwartungen strukturiert, von denen dann in einem zweiten Schritt die Selektion einer Handlung ausgeht. In einer auf der SEU-Theorie basierenden Konzeption modellierte Esser 1996 die Definition der Situation als eine Doppelstruktur in Form von zwei Selektionstufen, der Wahl des Modells und der des Informationsverarbeitungsmodus. In dem vorliegenden Beitrag wird gezeigt, wie sich aus den formalen Annahmen dieser beiden Selektionsschritte eine Verknüpfung zu einem dreidimensionalen Situationsbild ergibt. Dieses stellt dann in Abhängigkeit von gewählten Nutzenverhältnissen die Wahl des Informationsverarbeitungsmodus als Funktion von subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeiten dar.

Title: Bessere Politik dank Deregulierung des politischen Prozesses
Author: Reiner Eichenberger
Page: 43-60

Abstract: Today, political competition and, thus, the politicians, incentives to cater for the citizens, preferences are weakened by protectionist regulations aiming at the politicians, origin, their incomes, and the "production process of politics". This paper proposes to abolish these regulations and to institutionalize an open, international market for politics. Foreign as well as profit-seeking "policy producers" should be allowed to run directly for office without nominating specific individuals. This enables a policy supplier to become active in several countries and jurisdictions and, thus, to build up an international reputation for being credible, i.e. of sticking to his promises and not exploiting the voters after election. The deregulation program strengthens the influence of the weakly organized social groups and the governments, incentives to pursue what is of general interest.

Title: Deregulierung ist kein Allheilmittel! Oder: Was gut für die Wirtschaft ist, muss nicht gut für die Politik sein
Author: Stefan Marschall
Page: 61-68

Abstract: This paper responds to the reform agenda of Reiner Eichenberger who proposes the deregulation of the voting system in order to enhance the competition among the candidates and to improve the responsiveness of elected representatives. Based on the theory of parliamentary representation the paper argues that a simple transfer of economic principles into the realm of politics comes to its limits where the differences between the economic and political systems are significant. Regulation in politics is necessary and unavoidable where the abuse of political power is to be prevented.

Title: Die Bretter, die gebohrt werden, bleiben dick. Deregulierung der Politik scheitert an den Bedingungen der Massendemokratie
Author: Christoph Strünck
Page: 69-75

Abstract: Deregulation of the political process could be an instrument to reduce the overwhelming power of specialised interest groups and tighten the links between voters and politicians. But deregulation causes serious problems. Reputation pooling by international political enterprises depends on a transnational public sphere which is quite unrealistic. And political enterprises are not capable of shaping candidates for public service. Putting political finance in the hands of voters simply moves lobbying activities to the level of voters and does not change the asymmetrical influence of interest groups. Above all, the idea that political enterprises exchange experts in parliament does not fit in the crucial principle of parliamentary government and political responsibility.

Title: Politik ohne Wettberwerbshindernisse
Author: Erich Weede
Page: 76-80

Abstract: Whereas Eichenberger advocates better policies by deregulation of politics, politicians and political scientists in Western Europe are quite satisfied with Western democracies and their performance. This satisfication is based on neglecting the insights form "Public Choice" theorizing as well as on negating the coming pension crisis in ageing societies. Including Eichenberger's ideas there are now five schools of thought about how to improve Western democracies: more direct democracy, strengthening market-preserving federalism, less law and fewer lawyers, exploiting international rivalries for limiting government and, now, dismantling the protection from foreign competition ehich elected representatives enjoy almost everywhere in the West.

Title: Markt statt Politik?
Author: Reinhard Zintl
Page: 81-87

Abstract: Eichenberger's "deregulation" concept is designed to make political competition as similar to market competition as possible. The aim is to replace the competition of encompassing programmes by the competition of issue specific policies. In my view this idea is mistaken. First, it is by no means clear how the proposed institutions might work, since no hint is given how issue specific policy supply and unspecific political demand are matched. Second, and more improtant, the conception is normatively unconvincing. It aims at dissolving the political decisions of a society into an aggregate of separate and mutually independent issue specific policy decisions ? which would destroy the role politics has in a market society, namely, to provide market-complementary and not just market-analogous decisions.

Title: Will a Basic Income Do Justice to Women?
Author: Ingrid Robeyns
Page: 88-105

Abstract: This article addresses the question whether a basic income will be a just social policy for women. The implementation of a basic income will have different effects for different groups of women, some of them clearly positive, some of them negative. The real issues that concern feminist critics of a basic income are the gender-related constraints on choices and the current gender division of labour, which are arguably both playing at the disadvantage of women. It is argued that those issues are not adequately addressed by a basic income proposal alone, and therefore basic income has to be part of a larger packet of social policy measures if it wants to maximise real freedom for all.

Title: Real Freedom, the Market and the Family. A Reply
Author: Philippe Van Parijs
Page: 106-131

Abstract: The conception of social justice presented and defended in Philippe Van Parijs, "Real Freedom for All" entails, among other implication, the justification of an unconditional basic income. It was the subject of seven critical comments that forms issue 22 (2) and part of 23 (1) of ANALYSE & KRITIK. In this article, Van Parijs offers a comprehensive reply.

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