Analyse & Kritik

Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory


"Ausonio Marras"

Titel: Comment on Ausonio Marras: Intentionality and Physicalism: a Resolvable Dispute (ANALYSE & KRITIK 1/80)
Autor: Albert Flores
Seite: 183 - 189

Abstract: This paper explores the nature of the dispute between the competing theses of intentionality and physicalism, as discussed by A. Marras in his paper "Intentionality and Physicalism: a Resolvable Dispute". Although as originally conceived neither thesis is viable, it is apparent that a physicalist account of human behavior must take into consideration the intentionality of human behavior. This paper reviews a recent attempt to give a physicalist reconstruction of intentionality and shows that such an approach succeeds in providing scientifically acceptable explanations of human behavior without needing to answer the metaphysical questions that this dispute implies.

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Titel: Comment on Ausonio Marras: Intentionality and Physicalism: a Resolvable Dispute (ANALYSE & KRITIK 1/80)
Autor: Harold Morick
Seite: 190-193

Abstract: Contrary to Marras: (1) the third of Chisholm's Intentional criteria of sentences about mental states and events succeeds in highlighting an intuitive feature of Intentionality. (2) If there ist such a thing as modality, it resides either in the way we speak of things or in the things, regardless of the way we speak of them. If the latter, modal sentences fail to satisfy Chisholm's criterion for mentalistic sentences; and if the former, modal sentences turn out to be mentalistic sentences. So either way - if either the latter or the former - modal sentences fail to provide a counterexample to Chisholm's claim that his criterion picks out only mentalistic sentences. (3) Functionalisrn doesn,t enable physicalism to accomodate Intentional states and events, because functionalismrejects a traditional tenet of physicalism.

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Titel: Intentionality and Physicalism: a Resolvable Dispute
Autor: Ausonio Marras
Seite: 1-14

Abstract: This paper discusses the traditional antagonism between the Intentionalist and the Physicalist paradigms of the nature of mind and human behaviour. After tracing the development of the concept of intentionality in contemporary analytic philosophy and delineating some of the problems it presented for the so-called Thesis of Physicalism in several of its formulations, the paper proceeds to show how a liberalized methodology of theory construction and an understanding of functional systems and artificial intelligence models may enable us to reconstruct the intentional states of persons in a way compatible with the demands of physicalism. In particular, it is suggested that the intentional states which, on the intentionalist paradigm, mediate human behaviour might be understood as (theoretically postulated) functional states of a physical organism modelled on the functional states of a (probabilistic) automaton.

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