Suchergebnisse
"John R. Searle"
Titel: John Searle's Social Ontology. Comment to John R. Searle "Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society" (ANALYSE & KRITIK 20, 143-158)
Autor: Eerik Lagerspetz
Seite: 231-236
Abstract: The theory presented in John Searle's "The Construction of Social Reality" has a lot in common with the conventionalist view of institutions. Conventionalism, however, can explain how there can be institutional facts without pre-existing rules, and why people comply with institutional rules.
Titel: Collective Intentionality, Self-referentiality, and False Beliefs: Some Issues Concerning Institutional Facts. Comment to John R. Searle "Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society" (ANALYSE & KRITIK 20, 143-158)
Autor: Bruno S. Celano
Seite: 237-250
Abstract: J. R. Searle's general theory of social and institutional reality, as deployed in some of his recent work (The Construction of Social Reality 1995; Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society 1998), raises many deep and interesting problems. Four issues are taken up here: (1) Searle's claim to the effect that collective intentionality is a primitive, irreducible form of intentionality; (2) his account of one of the most puzzling features of institutional concepts, their having a self-referential component; (3) the question as to the point, or points, of having institutions; (4) Searle's claim to the effect that false beliefs on the part of the members of the relevant community are compatible with the existence of related institutional facts. It is argued that, under all four respects, Searle's theory proves to be hardly satisfactory.
Titel: On Some Difficulties Concerning John Searle's Notion of an 'Institutional Fact'. Comment to John R. Searle "Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society" (ANALYSE & KRITIK 20, 143-158)
Autor: Carsten Heidemann
Seite: 251-264
Abstract: John Searle's conception of institutional facts figures centrally in his latest works. It is defective for several reasons: (1) Searle's argument for philosophical realism is inconsistent. (2) Searle's conceptions of consciousness and collective intentionality are problematic. (3) The notion of normativity is indispensable in Searle's system, but cannot be accounted for and makes wide parts of his theory superfluous. (4) It is not clear what entities might be regarded as institutional facts. These problems have a common source: The philosophical basis of Searle's theory, his combination of realism and physicalist monism, clashes with his thesis that both the 'first-person-ontology' and normativity are irreducible.
Titel: Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society
Autor: John R. Searle
Seite: 143-158
Abstract: This lecture was originally given at the Einstein Forum in Berlin. It contains a summary of some of the themes in my book The Construction of Social Reality and continues the line of argument I presented there.