Analyse & Kritik

Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory


"Stefania Ottone"

Titel: Contractarian Compliance and the 'Sense of Justice': A Behavioral Conformity Model and Its Experimental Support
Autor: Lorenzo Sacconi / Marco Faillo / Stefania Ottone
Seite: 273-310

Abstract: The social contract approach to the study if institutions aims at providing a solution to the problem of compliance with rational agreements in situations characterized by a conflict between individual rationality and social optimality. After a short discussion of some attempts to deal with this problem from a rational choice perspective, we focus on John Rawls's idea of 'sense of justice' and its application to the explanation of the stability of a well-ordered society. We show how the relevant features of Rawls's theory can be captured by a behavioral game theory model of beliefs-dependent dispositions to comply, and we present the results of two experimental studies that provide support to the theory.

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Titel: Comment on Lorenzo Sacconi, Marco Faillo and Stefania Ottone: Contractarian Compliance, Welfarist Justice, and Conformist Utility
Autor: David Copp
Seite: 311-323

Abstract: This comment addresses two issues that arise in Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone's essay. The first is the problem of compliance as it arises in social contract theory. The second is the problem of avoiding an incoherence that arises in the formulation of welfarist principles of distributive justice if these principles are taken to be concerned with the distribution of welfare without restriction. Sacconi, Faillo, and Ottone define an interesting class of principles that govern only the distribution of 'material utility', which they distinguish from 'conformist utility'. Sacconi, Faillo, and Ottone are primarily concerned, however, to argue that there is a need to revise 'the utility maximization model of a rational economic man'. I discuss this claim briefly, in concluding the paper.

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