Analyse & Kritik

Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory

Suchergebnisse

"Wolfgang R. Köhler"

Titel: Können Personen ein Gegenstand des Verstehens sein? Ein Beitrag zur Hermeneutik der Person
Autor: Wolfgang R. Köhler
Seite: 89-110

Abstract: Is it possible to understand not only linguistic expressions and actions but also persons? According to common sense it surely is. Here it is argued that to understand a person a fourfold knowledge is required, although this knowledge is not identical with the understanding of a person. The understanding of a person is cognitive, but neither complete nor scientific.

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Titel: Der intersubjektive Faktor. Bemerkungen zu Richard Rortys erkenntnistheoretischem Behaviorismus
Autor: Wolfgang R. Köhler
Seite: 97-113

"Der Erkennende vermeidet die Selbsterkenntnis und lä ßt seine Wurzeln in der Erde stecken." Nietzsche

Abstract: The following article is only in part a review of Rorty's "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature". First I sketch the development of the two leading metaphors, which Rorty considers as being central for epistemology, namely the mirror of nature and the eye of the mind. Then I try to bring out the antirealist implications of Rorty's socalled "epistemological behaviorism" and to make sense of his slogan that truth is merely warranted assertability which in my view seems not to be in line with his favouring truth-conditional semantics. Thirdly I point to some possible consequences for the social sciences of using the antirealist "criterial" semantics of the later Wittgenstein, one of Rorty's heroes.

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Titel: Logischer Empirismus und normative Entscheidungstheorie
Autor: Wolfgang R. Köhler
Seite: 192-199

Abstract: Logical Empiricism, i.e. its non-cognitivism, does not destroy practical rationality because it is compatible with a rational decision on normative questions by way of consequen-tialist reasoning according to decision theory. It is argued that the contention that Logical Empiricism destroys practical rationality is based on a confusion of a rational decision on normative questions with the interpretation of the meaning of the answers to these questions. It is further argued that a rational decision on normative questions is only possible as far as the normative status of actions is concerned. It is not possible as far as the evaluative premises about basic values are concerned. Finally it is said that a rational decision on normative questions is principally deductive. Good-reason's-approach and practical syllogism are therefore only enthymematic and transformable into logical deduction. Of course, proving basic values or moral principles by way of logical deduction is both as impossible as needless.

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Titel: Zerstört der Logische Empirismus die Praktische Rationalität? Eine Erwiderung auf Beckermanns "Logischer Positivismus und radikale Gesellschaftsreform " und Hegselmanns "Grenzen der wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung des Wiener Kreises"
Autor: Wolfgang R. Köhler
Seite: 51-59

Abstract: It will be argued that the basic theoretical assumptions of logical empiricism do not destroy the possibility of practical reasoning, because the non-cognitivity of normative or evaluative statements still guarantees rational argument over practical questions and problems. Therefore, no logical inconsistency exists between logical empiricism, its non-cognitivist metaethics and socialist politics. In particular, logical empiricism is not committed to indifference concerning reactionary political programmes, although it itself entails no individual political programme.

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