Suchergebnisse
"Katharina Nieswandt"
Titel: Must I Honor Your Convictions? On Laura Valentini’s Agency-Respect View
Autor: Katharina Nieswandt
Seite: 51-65
Laura Valentini’s novel theory, the Agency-Respect View, says that we have a fundamental moral duty to honor other people’s convictions, at least pro tanto and under certain conditions. I raise doubts that such a duty exists indeed and that informative conditions have been specified. The questions that Valentini faces here have a parallel in Kant’s moral philosophy, viz. the question of why one has a duty to value the other’s humanity and the question of how to specify the maxim of one’s action. Additionally, I discuss the concept of a social convention and Valentini’s use of it.
Titel: Response to My Critics
Autor: Laura Valentini
Seite: 409-427
In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, I argue that norms that exist as a matter of social fact have moral force, when they do, by virtue of what I call the ‘agency-respect principle.’ In what follows, I address the comments and criticisms of my view kindly offered by N. P. Adams, Åsa Burman, George Klosko, Katharina Nieswandt, and Titus Stahl, and which have appeared in a previous issue of this journal. My responses, just like the corresponding criticisms, will address some of the core themes of the book, including: the nature of socially constructed norms, the plausibility of the agency-respect principle, how to best understand and ground political obligation, and, in general, whether we should think that socially constructed norms have (primarily) moral normativity, as opposed to some other type of normativity.